Assessing the "win-win" situation creation of the social impact bond model: balancing stakeholder interest by Cassibry, Kathryn Ann
A Work Project Presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in 





ASSESSING THE ‘WIN-WIN’ SITUATION CREATION OF THE SOCIAL IMPACT BOND 
MODEL: BALANCING STAKEHOLDER INTEREST 
 








A Project carried out on the Masters in Management Program, under the supervision of: 
Antonio Miguel 
 




Advocates of the Social Impact Bond (SIB) model say that it creates a ‘win-win’ situation by 
promoting cross-sectoral collaboration, while some critics claim it creates an imbalance in 
stakeholder interest.  This research explores this topic by defining what “success” means for each 
stakeholder and assessing all completed SIBs through a framework matrix and scoring 
methodology of critical success factors. I found that, while there is a statistically significant 
variance across stakeholder groups, there are several key common characteristics between the SIBs 
with the highest level of overall success and the lowest level of variance. This report will highlight 
these features.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception in 2009 with the HMP Peterborough intervention, the Social Impact 
Bond (SIB) model has been lauded by its proponents as an innovative financial tool that has the 
ability to promote collaboration across sectors and create a “win-win” situation for all stakeholders 
involved (Lehner, 2018; Wang et al 2013; Bolton, 2010). The public sector benefits because the 
risk is transferred to the private sector. The private sector benefits because they get the opportunity 
to invest in social innovation as well as see a return. And the social sector benefits because they 
receive working capital upfront without being subject to rigid government contracts.  
Cross-sectoral collaboration has long been considered a solution to the most pressing social 
problems of today (Warner, 2012), and social impact bonds were expected to provide an evidence-
base to confirm how coordination across sectors leads to increased positive impact. The common 
denominator for each SIB stakeholder is their desire for positive social outcomes to be achieved, 
but the wide variety of stakeholders involved also carries with it a wide variety of motivations and 
definitions of “success.”  
The research question of this thesis is “to what extent to social impact bonds create a ‘win-
win’ scenario for all stakeholders.” This report is focused on assessing the validity of this statement 
while keeping the outlined benefits, drawbacks, and limitations of the financing mechanism in 
mind. This question contains two sub-questions. One – aside from reaching the positive outcome 
targets, do “successful” social impact bonds create an advantageous situation for all stakeholders 
involved? Secondly – do some stakeholders benefit more or less than others?   





2.1. SOCIAL IMPACT BOND DEFINITION 
A social impact bond is a financial instrument used in impact investing in which private 
investors provide upfront capital to a social service provider or intermediary aimed at a specific 
measurable outcome, and the commissioner pays back that capital only if the target is achieved 
(Mulgan et al, 2010). More precisely, the set-up mechanism is normally initiated by a government 
that wants a specific positive social outcome, then a financial intermediary or a bond-issuing 
organization raises capital from foundations, companies, or private investors to support this 
positive social outcome. An intermediary identifies social service providers, outlines performance 
targets, and defines the price (Walsh, 2016). The funds are then given to service providers as 
upfront capital to cover operational costs. If the predetermined outcome is achieved, the 
government or commissioner pays back the initial investors plus a return on capital (OECD, 2016). 
The term “social impact bond” is known by different names in different countries – 
Payment-for-Success bonds in the US and Pay-for-Benefits bonds in Australia, for example 
(Gustafsson-Wright et al, 2015). It is also a bit of a misnomer in that it is not a “bond” in the 
financial security sense, but rather a “bond” in the “contract between multiple parties” sense. A 
“development impact bond” is a social impact bond that is commissioned by a foundation or other 
donor agency, rather than the government, and is implemented in developing countries 
(Gustafsson-Wright et al, 2015). 
2.2. CURRENT SOCIAL IMPACT BOND ECOSYSTEM 
As of April 2020, 174 impact bonds (both “social” and “developmental”) have been 
contracted in both the developed and developing world (Government Outcomes Lab, 2020). Of 
the total contracted, 39 have now completed service delivery, with 29 reporting at least some 
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repayment, 2 reporting no payment, and 15 either not yet public or evaluation ongoing. The United 
Kingdom and the United States represent most social impact bonds to date with 47 and 26, 
respectively (Gustafsson-Wright, 2020).  
2.3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.3.1. ADVANTAGES OF THE SOCIAL IMPACT BOND MODEL 
In the existing literature, the main advantages of social impact bonds are that they i) 
promote cross-sectoral collaboration, ii) provide an evidence base for innovative models, 
encourage rigorous data collection for outcome and performance management, iii) align private 
investor funding with positive social outcomes, and iv) equip service providers with stable and 
long-term income (Dear et al, 2016; OECD, 2013; Vennema, 2016; Disley et al 2011; Liebman, 
2011). 
Social impact bonds are designed to break down barriers between sectors by uniting all 
parties under one common goal. They are also intended to bring together existing complementary 
services that are siloed across sectors and different government agencies, driving the development 
of a holistic mix of services, which is strongly needed to address a problem (Paya et al, 2017). 
Moreover, they are said to foster innovation by funding innovative models that the public 
sector would otherwise not finance by shifting the risk away from the commissioner toward the 
investor (Butler et al, 2013). If a model is proven successful, capital is in retrospect more expensive 
than government self-financing. Therefore, social impact bonds are only appropriate when success 
is uncertain. The evidence that comes out of the evaluation methods at the heart of a social impact 
bond is one of the clearest advantages to the SIB model and one of the clearest contributors to the 
financial instrument’s “win-win” reputation. This is because it, a) ensures that money is flowing 
to the correct interventions, effectively saving public sector money, b) provides a basis upon which 
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service providers can scale their interventions, and c) provides evidence for future public sector 
social policies (Butler et al, 2013). 
Because demonstrating meaningful and measurable outcomes is an inherent part of social 
impact bonds, the collection of reliable and accurate data geared toward a carefully targeted 
population is an inevitable byproduct of the process, in theory (Mulgan et al, 2010). This benefits 
both the outcomes payer and the social service provider by promoting a build-up of institutional 
knowledge that the entities can implement in a straightforward way in the future, whether that be 
in the form of policy or a scale-up of service initiatives.  
At their core, social impact bonds offer the potential for increasing the magnitude and 
quality of investment in improving social wellbeing. The investment landscape is characterized by 
a current shift in preferences, and SIBs allow the demand of private investors for social impact 
investments to be met (OECD, 2013). It also opens new market opportunities for private investors, 
including further portfolio diversification and uncorrelated assets. In theory, they make tax-payers’ 
money more efficient by increasing accountability and value for money achieved through public 
services and they correct poor incentives in the field of public policy (Kohli et al, 2012).  
Social service providers are often beholden to annual revenue cycles in which they must 
constantly raise funds to maintain operations. Social impact bonds provide upfront working capital 
with continuity of funding over several years, allowing service providers to focus their efforts on 
service provision rather than fundraising (Dear et al, 2016). 
2.3.2. CRITICISMS OF THE SOCIAL IMPACT BOND MODEL 
Despite the growing popularity of social impact bonds in certain circles, there are also 
many critics. A popular sentiment about SIBs is that they are a great idea on paper, but in practice 
they do little to further social sector innovation and are cost-prohibitive without the support of 
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large foundations and financial intermediaries that are proponents of the tool. They require a 
significant amount of investment, both in terms of time and money, to become operational and 
then effective (Roy, et al 2017). Due to their high complexity, they often demand a high level of 
commitment and capacity, two factors that are often not readily available to most public sectors 
and donor agencies (Government Outcomes Lab, nd).  
As mentioned previously, social impact bonds are said to foster innovation because they 
allow the public sector to test out models without bearing the risk. However, there is also an 
argument that investors will not choose to finance an intervention unless it is a proven model. 
Rather than risky, innovative interventions, investors are much more likely to seek out SIBs that 
are most likely to provide secure and substantial returns (Roy, et al 2017). One study of the SIB 
ecosystem found that SIBs have been used to expand existing programs or those that have been 
known to produce positive results rather than funding innovative initiatives (Arena et al. 2016) 
There are also many ethical issues related to social impact bonds related to perverse 
incentives. “Parking” and “creaming” are two such perverse incentives. “Parking” refers to 
excluding target populations that are the hardest to reach and “creaming” refers to picking the 
highest achievers in the target group, thereby increasing the likelihood of reaching the target 
outcome without actually making the substantive changes regarding client needs it purports to 
(OECD, 2013). Intuitively, attaching payment to the achievement of results reinforces this 
tendency (Roy, et al 2017). 
2.4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIS 
There is no existing, universally accepted theoretical framework for evaluating social 
impact bonds from a stakeholder perspective. Further, because it is such a new social policy tool, 
there is very little theory regarding social impact bonds at all (Berndt et al, 2017). To this end, the 
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research question seeks inspiration from three theoretical models often linked to SIBs and 
balancing stakeholder interest in current literature – New Public Governance, Network 
Governance, and Stakeholder Theory. The theoretical approaches are related to the building of an 
attempt at a “win-win” scenario between the public sector, the private sector and society at large, 
so they are an appropriate lens through which to view this research question. 
2.4.1. NEW PUBLIC GOVERNANCE MODEL 
New Public Governance (NPG) is a modern paradigm of public administration that places 
an emphasis on inter-organizational governance strengthened by trust and relational contracts 
(Osborne, 2006) and has long been linked to SIBs (Dayson et al, 2019; Joy and Shields, 2013). 
Importantly, it also highlights the relational organization of a “plural” state, in which “multiple 
inter-dependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services,” though each stakeholder may 
have fragmented needs.  
2.4.2. NETWORK GOVERNANCE THEORY 
The Network Governance theory is a related concept that highlights the importance of 
cooperation between stakeholders (Warner, 2015) under conditions of complexity, uncertainty and 
asset specificity (Jones et al, 1997). It also states that the creation of public value (ie social impact) 
is dependent on the strength of the relationship between key stakeholders (Jørgensen et al 2007; 
Stoker, 2006). Both theories, as they relate to the social impact bond model, support the need to 
assess the extent to which a beneficial scenario is created for each stakeholder involved so that the 
interrelational bond remains strong and positive impact can be assured. 
2.4.3. STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND “KEEPING SCORE” 
Finally, stakeholder theory addresses what none of the other theories do – the need to 
balance stakeholder interest. Stakeholder theory is a management approach to decision-making 
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that is based on the premise that all stakeholders – not just shareholders – should be considered 
when making decisions (Reynolds et al, 2006). It argues that managers can maintain the support 
of their stakeholders by considering and balancing their respective interests (Reynolds et al, 2006; 
Clarkson, 1998; Freeman, 1984; Jones and Wicks, 1999) depending on each stakeholder’s 
saliency, or their cumulative power over and interest in the issue (source). With roots in 
stakeholder strategies like Freeman’s “Keeping Score,” balancing stakeholder interest is arguably 
the most import aspect of stakeholder management theory because it is the main mechanism by 
which managers address stakeholders with disparate needs and wants (Reynolds et al, 2006, 
Freeman 1984). Further, theory suggests that the more equal the stakeholder salience, the more 
likely it is that managers will attempt to balance interest. 
In the context of the social impact bond model, which is considered an inherently 
interdependent and co-creative model which lacks an explicit “manager” to decide how to balance 
stakeholder interest, these theories are all connected. Stakeholder theory holds that stakeholder 
interests should be balanced based on the stakeholder saliency, and the network governance theory 
and NPG model hold that each stakeholder is equally salient. 
3. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. CASE SELECTION CRITERIA 
This report will only analyze SIBs that have been completed and officially and publicly 
evaluated. As of May 2020, 39 SIBs have been completed globally. Of those 39 SIBs, 27 have 
been included in this report. The remaining 12 were omitted because their outcome results were 
not publicly available and therefore incapable of being analyzed by all critical success factors. 
Because the total population of completed and officially evaluated SIBs is small, the total 
population can be analyzed. Sampling is not necessary. 
 10 
 
3.2. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
At the outset of this report, extensive data collection and familiarization was conducted on 
each of the considered SIB contracts. Most of the data collected for this report came from the 
Social Impact Bond Project Database of the Government Outcomes Lab of the Blavatnik School 
of Government of the University of Oxford, the Impact Bond Global Database from Social Finance 
UK, and a proprietary SIB mapping tool from Maze Impact. 
Other data sources included the financial reports of social service providers to demonstrate 
sustained funding, independent final project evaluation reports to demonstrate safeguards against 
perverse incentives, and intermediary project impact reports to demonstrate IRR and improvement 
over time. When possible, semi-formal interviews were conducted with various stakeholders to 
expound on details and support findings. 
The data collected was a mix of qualitative data, such as testimonials from stakeholders 
and project narratives in third-party case study reports, as well as quantitative data, such as 
financial returns and binary indicators from the online SIB databases. 
To verify each piece of data, a method of triangulation was employed by cross-referencing 
different data sources (Suter, 2012). This was especially important when combining qualitative 
and quantitative data. 
3.3. RESEARCH AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The data was organized using an adaptation of the Framework Method to fit a mixed-
method approach and analyzed using comparative descriptive results derived from the scoring 
methodology of the Multi-attribute Utility Theory (MAU) (Mason et al, 2018). 
The Framework Method is a qualitative data analysis method used to structure research 
data and identify commonalities and differences by focusing on relationships between sections of 
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the data and drawing descriptive and/or explanatory conclusions (Byrne, 2017). It provides a 
“systematic model for managing and mapping data” (Gale et al, 2013). This report will focus 
exclusively on descriptive conclusions. 
The methodology is not particularly aligned with any theoretical approach, so it is a flexible 
tool that can be adapted to various qualitative approaches (Gale et al, 2013). The method is often 
used to analyze semi-structured and structured interview transcripts, but can be adapted to other 
types of textual data, including documents and qualitative databases, as it is in this report (Pope et 
al, 2000). The Framework Method is usually intended to analyze purely qualitative data but can 
be adapted for a mixed-method approach, as it is in this report (Pope et al, 2000). 
The main feature of the Framework Method is the matrix output, in which individual 
“cases” make up the rows, “thematic codes and categories” make up the columns, and 
“summarized data” make up each cell (Ritchie et al, 2018). This gives the researcher the ability to 
compare data both across cases and within cases (Gale et al, 2013). In this report, the “cases” are 
the individual SIBs and the “thematic codes and categories” are the critical success factors. Often, 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CASDAQ) such as NVivo is needed to 
organize large sets of data, however, because the amount of data considered is small, an Excel 
spreadsheet was sufficient for the purposes of this research question. 
Once the data was organized, coded and categorized using the Framework Method, the 
data was then quantitized in order to be scored and evaluated. Quanititizing refers to “the numerical 
translation, transformation, or conversion of qualitative data” (Sandelowski, 2003) and is very 
common in mixed method research in order to verify interpretations and/or transform data so it 
can be analyzed statistically. In the case of this report, the qualitative data was quantitized in order 
to be combined into one data set and analyzed using descriptive statistics. 
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3.4. EVALUATION DESIGN AND DEFINING “SUCCESS” 
Determining the definitions of success – aside from the outcome targets - for each 
stakeholder is a challenging and somewhat subjective exercise. For this reason, this report aims to 
find markers of objective success, meaning markers that are measurable, accessible, coherent, and 
universally-accepted. These parameters, along with their respective weights, have been developed 
through interviews with various SIB experts from Social Finance UK, Social Finance Netherlands, 
Mustard Seed/Maze Impact, Third Sector Capital Partners, IDInsight, and the MaRS Center for 
Impact Investing. 
The clear parameter for success across all stakeholders is whether the target positive 
outcome was reached. Because this is a measure of success for all parties involved and not a 
differential factor between stakeholders, it will be noted but not focused upon. Rather, only the 
SIBs which reached at least one of their outcome targets will be assessed. 
The stakeholder groups this report will be specifically focusing on 1) outcome payers, 2) 
social service providers, and 3) investors.  
3.4.1. SCORING METHODOLOGY 
The scoring methodology was based on Multi-attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) approach 
to ranking and selection, which outlines an approach to ranking based on a comparisons of systems 
(i.e. contracts) and on multiple performance measures (Butler et al, 2001). These performance 
measurements are the “thematic categories” of the Framework Method and were established from 
an extensive review of the literature and the guidance of the SIB experts mentioned above. 
The scoring function for conventional MAU is along a three-pronged constructed scale 
from 0 – 1, wherein a score of 0 is awarded if it does not meet the criteria, a score of .5 is awarded 
if it partially meets the criteria and a score of 1 is awarded if it fully meets the criteria (Mitre, 
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2013). The final step is to assign a weight – with guidance from the aforementioned experts – to 
each evaluation criteria using the paired comparison method.  
This scoring methodology was developed with guidance from a former employee of the 
Nova SBE Data Science Knowledge Center. 
3.4.2. DEFINING SUCCESS FOR THE OUTCOMES PAYER 
For outcomes payers, the three parameters of success considered will be 1) whether the 
SIB produced an evidence-based mode from which policy can be built, 2) whether the learnings 
from the SIB resulted in retained institutional knowledge and 3) whether there were safeguards 
against perverse incentives.  
The first parameter regarding evidence-based models is important to any social impact 
bond because, from the very beginning, SIBs were designed to “establish an evidence base which 
would lead government to adopt and scale these proven solutions” and potentially implement it 
into policy (Dear et al, 2016). Social impact bonds fall along an “innovation-replication-scale” 
spectrum (Dear et al, 2016).  At one end of the spectrum lies completely novel interventions whose 
purpose is to test innovation. In these cases, the measurement methodology is often non-
experimental, meaning there is no comparison group used. Data is collected, validated, and either 
compared pre- and post-intervention or using historical data. This measurement methodology is 
not inherently bad, but it does mean that it cannot provide a high level of confidence regarding the 
attributability of the intervention to the outcomes and that the outcomes were directly caused by 
that specific intervention (Reynolds et al, 2018). 
 On the other end of the spectrum is the “gold standard” of impact evaluation – the 
randomized control trial (RCT) (Brookings, 2017). In a randomized control trial, individuals are 
assigned randomly to either an intervention group or a control group (wherein they do not receive 
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the intervention) and the results of the two are compared. However, it should be noted that there 
are many valid reasons why a SIB would choose to use a non-experimental measurement 
methodology over an RCT. RCTs require a high degree of financial resources and time and can 
pose ethical questions surrounding withholding care from vulnerable individuals.  
In these cases, quasi-experimental approaches can help build an evidence base and work 
toward replicability. A quasi-experimental approach involves finding a counterfactual group of 
individuals and matching them to the experimental group. These counterfactual groups could be 
comprised of similar individuals who were not able to participate in the intervention due to limited 
project resources or to a national comparison group (Reynolds et al, 2018). 
The second parameter of success to measure for the outcome payer is whether the SIB 
fostered retention of institutional knowledge. In other words, was there an incorporation of 
learning that built capacity on the outcome payer side so that they could deploy these outcomes-
based commissioning tools in a straightforward way? This parameter is a bit subjective, so a group 
of four proxies is considered. First, is the SIB part of a commissioner outcome fund? If so, this 
signifies that there is a commitment to apply these learnings in the future. Most of the SIBs that 
are funded through an outcome fund also use a rate card, which requires that the procurement team 
do a lot of background work to define, so this is the second variable. Third, who lead the initiative? 
If the government took an active role in specifying the intervention rather than taking a black-box 
approach–wherein the service provider, SPV, or intermediary lead the intervention and the 
outcome payer plays a passive, reactive role—this suggests a higher likelihood that the learnings 
will be used by the commissioner in the future. The fourth, and perhaps the most obvious, proxy 
is whether or not the commissioner created subsequent SIBs. If so, they developed the capacity to 
deploy their learnings to future projects. 
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The final parameter of success for an outcome payer is whether there were safeguards in 
place to protect against perverse incentives to ensure that the outcomes they are paying for are 
truly valid. As described previously in this report, these perverse incentives include 
mismanagements like “creaming” or “cherry-picking.” The proxies used to signify this parameter 
are 1) whether an independent evaluator was used for both final evaluation and performance 
management and 2) whether an intermediary was involved in the design of the SIB. The second 
proxy usually signifies that a rigorous feasibility study was conducted pre-launch. 
3.4.3. MEASURING SUCCESS FOR THE OUTCOMES PAYER 
First, each SIB was coded using the Framework Method. Then, each code was 
“quantitized” and given a numerical equivalent. 
CATEGORY OPEB OPRIK OPRIK OPRIK OPRIK OPPPI OPPPI 
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KEY:  OPEB = Outcome Payer Evidence Base  OPRIK = Outcome Payer Retention of Institutional Knowledge  OPPPI= Outcome Payer Protection Against Perverse Incentives 
Table 1: Framework of coded data for the DWP Advance Programme SIB for the outcome payer stakeholder group. The other 26 
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DWP Innovation Fund Round I - 
West Midlands (The Advance 
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KEY:  OPEB = Outcome Payer Evidence Base  OPRIK = Outcome Payer Retention of Institutional Knowledge  OPPPI= Outcome Payer Protection Against Perverse Incentives  
OPRIKY1 = outcome fund OPRIKY2 = Government-lead OPRIKY3 = rate card OPRIKY4 = subsequent SIBs OPPP1= independent evaluator OPPPI2 = intermediary 
Table 2: Scoring of quantitized data for the DWP Advance Programme SIB for the outcome payer stakeholder group. The other 
26 SIB contracts are detailed in Appendix 5. 
For the first parameter, while an RCT will undoubtedly provide a better basis from which 
to scale and integrate an intervention at policy-level, a stronger base of evidence is provided in a 
successful quasi-experimental design than a semi-successful RCT. For this reason, each SIB will 
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be measured on a 3-point scale, ranging from non-experimental (0) to quasi-experimental (.5), to 
randomized control trials (1), with allowances for strength of outcome metrics. More details can 
be found in Appendix 4 and 5.  
For the “retention of institutional knowledge” parameter, the SIBs were again measured on 
a 3-point scale. SIBs that displayed no evidence of any of the four proxies will receive a 0, SIBs 
that displayed one or two out of the four proxies will receive a .5, and SIBs that displayed two or 
more proxies will receive a 1. 
The “protection against perverse incentives” parameter was also measured on a 3-point 
scale, ranging from no proxies evident (0) to one proxy evident (.5), to both proxies evident (1). 
Once all parameters were measured, each score was assigned a weight and compiled into 
a total percentage of score granted compared to score possible. 
3.4.4. DEFINING SUCCESS FOR THE SERVICE PROVIDER 
For social service providers, the three parameters of success are 1) whether the SIB 
produced a scalable, evidence-based model, 2) whether the SIB resulted in sustained funding either 
from the outcomes payer or the investor and 3) whether they were able to build their performance 
management practices and display improvement over time. 
The first parameter of success for a service provider is the same as for the outcome payer 
– creating an evidence-based model for their intervention. According to a Brookings Institute 
survey, “being able to scale an intervention that works” was listed as the leading motivation for 
social service providers in a SIB (Gustafsson-Wright, 2016). While the ultimate purpose for scale 
may not be the same for outcome payers as for social service providers (providers may not care if 
interventions are ultimately implemented into policy), it remains important for providers to have 
demonstrable evidence of success for their work. 
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The second parameter of success is whether or not the social service provider was able to 
receive sustained funding as a result of the SIB. A clear benefit of the SIB mechanism for a 
provider is that they receive upfront funding and working capital for their intervention, but this is 
a given. Instead, this parameter refers to the funding that comes outside of the SIB contract. This 
can come in the form of government procurement contracts from the outcome payer side, from 
grants or loans from the investor post-SIB, or from subsequent SIB contracts from either the same 
funder or the same commissioner. 
Finally, the third parameter of success was whether the provider was able to prove an 
improvement over time due to heightened performance management. Developing a culture of 
monitoring and evaluation was deemed a top motivation for service providers (Gustafsson-Wright, 
2016) and should, in theory, lead to evidence of increased impact over time. Most SIBs are 
structured with multiple outcome evaluation phases, which allows the provider to demonstrate this 
improvement. Demonstration of improvement over time is also a key aspect of the reputational 
benefits that a social service provider can achieve through a successful SIB-funded intervention. 
3.4.5. MEASURING SUCCESS FOR THE SERVICE PROVIDER 
As with the outcome payers, first, each SIB was coded using the Framework Method. Then, 
each code was “quantitized” and given a numerical equivalent. 
CONTRACT SPEB SPSF SPIOT 
Variable / Proxy Variable 
Evaluation 
Methodology 





DWP Innovation Fund Round I - West 
Midlands (The Advance Programme) 
non-experimental; 
outcomes achieved 
providers did not receive 
sustained funding 
improvement in later 
phases 
KEY: SPEB = Service Provider Evidence Base SPSF= Service Provider Sustained Funding SPIOT= Service Provider Evidence of Improvement over Time 
 
Table 3: Framework of coded data for the DWP Advance Programme SIB for the service provider stakeholder group. The other 
26 SIB contracts are detailed in Appendix 3. 





   weight   weight   weight   
DWP Innovation Fund Round I - West 
Midlands (The Advance Programme) 0.5 0.33 0 0.33 1 0.33 0.495 
 
KEY: SPEB = Service Provider Evidence Base SPSF= Service Provider Sustained Funding SPIOT= Service Provider Evidence of Improvement over Time 
 
Table 4: Scoring of quantitized data for the DWP Advance Programme SIB for the service provider stakeholder group. The other 
26 SIB contracts are detailed in Appendix 6. 
The first parameter of success was measured in the same way as with the outcome payers. 
The cells were simply copied over. 
Evidence of sustained funding was measured on a binary scale. If there is evidence of 
sustained funding, it will be granted a 1. If there is no evidence of sustained funding, it will be 
granted a 0. 
Evidence of improvement over time was also measured on a binary scale. If there is 
evidence of improvement over time, it will be granted a 1. If there is no evidence of improvement 
over time, it will be granted a 0. 
Just as with the outcome payer scores, each score was assigned a weight and compiled into 
a total percentage of score granted compared to score possible. 
3.4.6. DEFINING SUCCESS FOR THE INVESTOR 
Finally, the parameters of success for the investors are twofold: 1) return on investment 
and 2) whether or not the outcomes helped further SIB development for a major proponent of the 
SIB model. Just as with all social investors, the motivation for a SIB funder is a combination of 
financial and social reasonings (Dear et al, 2016). Their parameters of success should, therefore, 
reflect this dual motivation. 
For return on investment, Target IRR vs Actual IRR will be assessed. In instances where 
concrete numbers are not available, textual evidence of Actual IRR exceeding Target IRR in some 
capacity will be considered.  
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It should be noted that investor motivations differ greatly depending on the contexts. 
Investors in Portuguese SIBs, for example, have their returns capped at 0%. Portuguese investors 
do not consider return on investment to be a definition of success. In these cases, IRR will not be 
considered, and social motivation will be considered alone. 
3.4.7. MEASURING SUCCESS FOR THE INVESTOR 
As with the other stakeholders first, each SIB was coded using the Framework Method. 
Then, each code was “quantitized” and given a numerical equivalent. 
Contract IIRR IPSIBM 
Variable / Proxy Variable Actual v Target IPSIBM 
DWP Innovation Fund Round I - West Midlands (The 
Advance Programme) 




KEY:   IRR: Internal Rate of Return  IPSIBM = Investor Proponent of SIB Model   
 
Table 5: Framework of coded data for the DWP Advance Programme SIB for the investor stakeholder group. The other 26 SIB 
contracts are detailed in Appendix 3. 
Contract 
IR
R   
IPSIB
M   
Investor Total 
Score 
   
weig
ht   
weig
ht   
DWP Innovation Fund Round I - West Midlands (The 
Advance Programme) 1 0.9 0 0.1 0.9 
KEY:   IRR: Internal Rate of Return  IPSIBM = Investor Proponent of SIB Model   
 
Table 6: Scoring of quantitized data for the DWP Advance Programme SIB for the investor stakeholder group. The other 26 SIB 
contracts are detailed in Appendix 6.  
The “target vs actual IRR” was measured on a binary scale. If Actual IRR meets or exceeds 
Target IRR, it was granted a 1. If not, it was granted a 0. 
The second parameter was based on whether the investor was a major proponent of the SIB 
model. This was done on a binary scale. If they were proponents and the outcomes were achieved, 
they received a 1. If the outcomes were not achieved or if they were not particularly proponents, 
they received a 0.  
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Once the individual parameters have been measured, each score was assigned a weight and 
compiled into a total percentage of score granted compared to score possible. 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Once all scores were calculated for each contract, stakeholder, and success factor, the 
combinded average was taken per each stakeholder using the assigned weights for each factors 
(Appendix 7). This was done for every SIB contract, resulting in a combined percentage success 
score for each stakeholder per case.  
4.1.1. OVERALL BALANCE IN STAKEHOLDER INTEREST 
 If social impact bond contracts truly create “win-win” situations for all stakeholders 
involved, we could expect to see a relatively low variability of success scores between stakeholder 
groups. On average, outcome payers experienced a .648 success score, meaning that they achieved 
about 64.8% of their additional critical success factors (excluding outcome achievement, which is 
already assumed). Service providers experienced a lower average – about 54%. Investors, on the 
other end of the spectrum, achieved about 77% of their additional critical success factors.  
I ran an ANOVA to assess the overall significance of the test. The null hypothesis in this 
situation would be that the mean success score would not change depending on the stakeholder 
group. My hypothesis is that stakeholder group does, in fact, have an effect on overall success 
score. The results were as follows: 
SUMMARY      
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Outcome 
Payers 27 17.5 0.648148 0.026439   
Service 
Providers 27 14.685 0.543889 0.081287   
Investors 27 20.65 0.764815 0.07208   
       
       




Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 0.659604 2 0.329802 5.502643 0.005814 3.113792 
Within 
Groups 4.674948 78 0.059935    
       
Total 5.334552 80         
Table 7: ANOVA analysis of variance within the success scores of the three stakeholder groups 
Here, we can see that the F value calculated in the test is 5.503, while the F statistic is 
3.114. In statistics, if the F value calculated in a test is larger than the F critical value, you can 
reject the null hypothesis (Snedecor et al, 1989). Additionally, the p-value is less than the standard 
alpha of .05, meaning that it is statistically significant, which means we should reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore, we can reject the hypothesis that the success of a SIB is equal for all 
stakeholder groups. In other words, stakeholder group does affect success.  
The variance, which measures the variability of the data, for these three stakeholder groups 
was about .00837, and the standard deviation was .0915, meaning that on average the success 
scores are about .0915 points away from the average. This number was found using the cumulative 
average success score for each stakeholder group, so the total possible was 1 for each stakeholder. 
While the standard deviation is not zero as would be case under perfect conditions, this number 
doesn’t tell us much about relative variability. To calculate relative variability, we must find the 
coefficient of variation, which is about 14.1%. This means that, on average, the difference ration 
between the standard deviation and the average stakeholder success rates is about 14.1%. 
4.1.2. TRENDS AMONG SIBS WITH GREATEST AND LEAST STAKEHOLDER 
INTEREST BALANCE 
 Interestingly, when calculating for the variance of the most successful SIBs- i.e. the top 
50%, where the total score across all stakeholders was at least 2 out of 3 – the variance was lower 
at 10.38%. On the other hand, the variation for the least successful SIBs – i.e. the bottom 50%, 
where the total score across all stakeholders was 1.9 out of 3 or below – the variance was 
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significantly higher – 43.58%. This suggests that as total success increases, the equitable 






Mean 0.79548 0.29551 0.65228 
Variance 0.00682 0.01659 0.00814 
Standard Deviation 0.08258 0.12878 0.09024 
Coefficient of Variance 0.10381 0.4358 0.13834 
Table 8: Difference in variance between most successful and leas successful SIBs 
In support of this relation, a correlation matrix between the overall average success score 
per contract and the coefficient of variance of each SIB was -0.29, meaning that there is a negative 
correlation between success and variability. In other words, as the degree of success changes, so 
does the dispersion of the data.  
  Average CV 
Average 0.03089  
CV -0.029 0.04694 
Table 9: Correlation matrix of the mean success score and the mean coefficient of variance for each SIB 
 I also did a correlation matrix of the average of each stakeholder group to assess whether 
one group’s success negatively or positively correlated with the others. When I did so, it showed 
that all were positively correlated with each other. When one stakeholder group experiences 






Outcome Payers 0.02546   
Service Providers 0.01873 0.07828  
Investors 0.00706 0.02662 0.06941 
Table 10: Correlation matrix of the mean success scores for each stakeholder group 
 The five SIBs with the least amount of variance among stakeholder groups all belong to 
the same outcome fund – the Innovation Fund of the UK Department of Work & Pensions. The 
same five SIBs also have high total overall scores, with averages of 2.5 – 2.6 out of a possible 3. 
The consistencies across these five SIBs are strong evidence of retained institutional knowledge, 
strong evidence of protection against perverse incentives, evidence of sustained funding for the 
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service providers, strong performance management that demonstrates improvement over time, and 
an actual IRR exceeding the target. 
 The five SIBs with the highest variance among stakeholder groups have less in common, 
but the most striking similarity is a very low average success score for the service providers. Four 
out of the five SIBs with the highest variance have a service provider success score of less than .2. 
Three have service provider scores of 0. This meant that there was no sustained funding, no 
demonstration of improvement over time, and no evidence-based model with which to scale their 
intervention. At the same time, the majority have very strong outcome payer scores, with four out 
of five scoring full marks for the retention of institutional marks and three out of four with full 
protection against perverse incentives. It is also important to note that the Academico Codigo SIB 
from Portugal had a very low investor score because IRR is capped at 0%.  
4.2. LIMITATIONS 
 Although an extensive amount of research was done into each SIB contract, the largest 
limitation on this research is the lack of information. Despite the hundreds of documents that 
were analyzed, there remained a good deal of information that was unavailable for public access.  
Relatedly, the analysis would have certainly been stronger if more interviews could have 
been conducted with relevant stakeholders. Though the critical success factors were developed and 
validated by a number of relevant parties and experts in the field, the scores could have been 
strengthened by firsthand accounts of each stakeholders’ experience. Unfortunately, recent current 
events forced many offices to close and most people were very hard to contact. 
The third significant limitation is the nature of subjectivity in choosing the critical success 
factors, the weights and the scores. Inevitably, the personal experiences of myself and the experts 
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who guided me will shape some of the analysis. However, every attempt was made at curtailing 
any bias.  
Finally, there is a limitation on the critical success factors that can be measured 
quantitatively. For example, it is hard to measure the extent to which a service provider’s 
reputation was impacted by the outcomes of the social impact bond and the political risk taken by 
the outcome payer. 
4.3. DISCUSSION  
The results of the analysis suggest that the predominant assumption that the SIB model 
creates a win-win situation is not entirely true at the current moment. There is a significant, though 
not drastic, difference between each stakeholder group in terms of their calculated success scores. 
This is especially true among the lesser successful SIBs. This implies that, as overall success rises, 
so does the balance of stakeholder interest. Additionally, there is a positive correlation between 
stakeholder success scores, meaning that as the success of one stakeholder group rises, so do the 
others. The SIBs that had the highest success scores also tended to have low variances between 
stakeholder groups.  
This suggests that the best way to balance stakeholder interest and promote success across 
the various parties involved to create a “win-win” situation is to pay attention not solely to the 
achievement of the outcome targets, but also to the various additional success factors. 
Additionally, extra attention should be paid to the needs of the service provider, as they are 
typically the ones who come up a bit short. 
 The primary recommendation is to focus on the success factors that SIBs with the lowest 
variance have in common: strong evidence of retained institutional knowledge, strong evidence of  
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protection against perverse incentives, evidence of sustained funding for the service providers, and 
strong performance management that demonstrates improvement over time.  
5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Future development should be made to the analysis framework to make it more 
encompassing of all bonds. Additionally, as the Social Impact Bond model evolves, as all SIB 
experts spoken to during this research say that it will, the framework should also evolve. Only 
about 22% of all contracted SIBs have been completed and only about 15% have been evaluated 
here.  
6. CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, while the current Social Impact Bond ecosystem does not fully meet its 
promise to create a “win-win” situation in all current completed contracts, there is still a great 
potential. On the one hand, there is a statistically significant difference in comprehensive “success” 
between the stakeholder groups at the current moment. Service providers tend to fare worse in 
meeting their definition of success through the SIB model, while the investors tend to fare best.  
 On the other hand, the social impact bond model is still in an experimental phase and it is 
entirely possible that future SIBs will follow a path of the DWP Innovation Fund SIBs. It is a 
promising sign that, as the overall success of the impact bond increases, the difference between 
individual success scores decreases. Relatedly, as the success of one stakeholder increases, the 
success of the others tends to do as well. This suggests a brighter future of shared value and success 
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8.  APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Coding Key for Qualitative Framework Matrix 
KEY   
OPEB Outcome Payer - Evidence-Base 
OPRIK Outcome Payer - Retention of Institutional Knowledge 
OPRIK1 Proxy Variable - Presence of an Outcomes Fund 
OPRIK2 Proxy Variable - Intervention Approach 
OPRIK3 Proxy Variable - Presence of a Rate Card 
OPRIK4  Proxy Variable - Involvement in Subsequent SIBs 
OPPPI Outcome Payer - Protection Against Perverse Incentives 
OPPPI1 Proxy Variable - Presence of Independent Evaluator 
OPPPI2 Proxy Variable - Intermediary Involved in the SIB Design 
SPEB Service Provider - Evidence-Base 
SPSF Service Provider - Sustained Funding 
SPIOT Service Provider - Evidence of Improvement Over Time 
IIIR Investor - IRR, Actual vs Target 
IPSIBM Investor - Proponent of SIB Model 
 




Appendix 3: Qualitative Framework Matrix – Service Providers and Investors 
 
 




RCT; outcomes achieved 1 
RCT; outcomes semi-achieved 0.75 
quasi-experimental; outcomes achieved 0.75 
quasi-experimental; outcomes semi-achieved 0.5 
non-experimental; pre-existing strong evidence based 
model 0.75 
non-experimental; outcomes achieved 0.5 
 42 
 
non-experimental; outcomes semi-achieved 0 
outcomes fund 1 
no outcomes fund 1 
government-lead intervention 1 
blackbox approach 0 
rate card 1 
no rate card 0 
subsequent sibs 1 
no subsequent sibs 0 
independent evaluator 1 
no independent evaluator 0 
intermediary 1 
no intermediary 0 
evidence of sustained funding 1 
some evidence of sustained funding 0.5 
no evidence of sustained funding 0 
demonstration of improvement over time 1 
no demonstration of improvement over time 0 
positive return 1 
negative return 0 
actual IRR did meet target 1 
actual IRR did not meet target 0 
proponents; outcomes achieved 1 










































Appendix 7 – Scoring Methodology Matrix – All Stakeholders, Proxies Hidden 
 
 
Appendix 8 – Excel Spreadsheet Titled 1920S2_40087_Kathryn_Cassibry_Part 2  
Content Highlights: 
 “Qualitative Framework” – Excel version of Appendix 2 and 3 
“Scoring Methodology” – Excel Version of Appendix 5 – 7 
“Supplemental Data with Sources” – Breakdown of semi-organized data per SIB contract with 
references for each 
 
 
 
